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THE EVIDENCE ACT OF 1887.
[CONCLUDED.]

Clause (e) of Section 5 contains an exception to competency
in civil cases, of which there is no analogue in respect to criminal proceedings. A party to a thing or contract in action may
be dead. His right may have passed to his executor or administrator; to his heir, to his alienee. In such a case says the
clause, the "surviving or remaining party" or any other person
whose interest shall be adverse to the right of the deceased
shall be incompetent, with respect to any matter occurring before
the death of the deceased party.
A contract is made between A and B. In any controversy
between them respecting it, each is competent to testify. If A
dies, B becomes incompetent! Why this surprising result?
Was it not bad enough that A's knowledge ceased to be available? Why broaden the evils wrought by death by determining
that B's knowledge shall also cease to be available? ' A's death
has given to B a chance to perjure himself without A's contra-

diction. It shall be assumed that B will avail himself of this
chance if allowed to testify at all. Such was the consideration
which induced judges of a former age to refuse to hear parties,
or interested witnesses. They will probably testify falsely.
Hence they shall not testify at all.
The estates of the dead would be in peril, if surviving antagonistic parties could testify, say the defenders of the disqualification of the survivor. But justice is not on the side of a
man because he has died. Perhaps his cause was bad. Had
he survived he could not have made it appear good, except by
perjury. But his death has silenced the living man, so that he
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cannot honestly support his better cause. In order to spare the
estates of the dead from spoliation through'false evidence, it is
necessary to expose the estates of the living to spoliation,
through the rendering unusable of true evidence. Wigmore
pertinently remarks,' "The argument of the latter passage [a
quotation from the opinion of Haymond, J., in Owens v. Owens,
14 W. Va. 88 that a contrary rule would place in great peril
the estates of the dead] sufficiently typifies the superficial reasoning on which the rule rests. Are not the estates of the living
endangered daily by the present rule which bars from proof so
many honest claims? Can it be more important to save dead
men's estates from false claims than to save living men's estates
from loss by lack of proof ? The truth is that the present rule
is open, in almost equal degree, to every one of the objections
which were successfully urged nearly a century ago, against the
interest-rule in general."
The rule- which allows parties to a contract to testify when
all are alive, gives unequal opportunities to them. One is
shrewd, skillful, bold, ready to commit perjury; the other is
dull, an unskillful speaker, timid, conscientious. Why not
disqualify one party if the other is ascertainable to be his decided inferior as a witness?
A has a claim against several parties. One of these dies,
but the others survive. Because the dead man's interest in the
partnership property will be affected by A's recovery, he must
not testify, and the surviving parties even, must enjoy the benefit of his incapacity. 2 They can testify for themselves and for
the deceased, without necessarily qualifying A. The joint
parties might be twenty as well as two or four, the living owners of nineteen twentieths, or the joint owners might have unequal interests; the owner of one thousandth only, dying, and
the owner of the other 999 thousandths surviving, yet the survivor will get as benefit from the death of the owner of the
twentieth or of the thousandth, the closing of the mouth of the
opposite party, whose claim may thus be made incapable of
establishment, however just.
The provision of clause (e) by which incompetency from
interest is preserved, has led to much quibbling, and given rise
to much appellate litigation. When A deals with B, through
'1 Evidence, 707.
2Lockard

v. Vare, 230 Pa. 591.
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B's agent C, the death of C, who only besides A knows what
the transaction was, does not close the mouth of A. A can testify without the check of possible contradiction by the only
other person, now dead, who knows the transaction. In3 this
respect the courts bow humbly to the letter of the statute.
If A makes a contract with B, for the payment by B of a
stim of money to C, the death of A, the source of C's right, is
said not to preclude B from exploding C's claim by his testimony. Yet A only knew the facts, being a party to the transaction, and his death has withdrawn the only available evidence
not in the control of B."
Clause (e) excepts the case of claiming by devolution from
the general provision in it for incompetency. In issues devisavit
vel non or in other inquiries respecting the property of a deceased owner, the parties claiming it by devolution on the death
of the owner, all persons are declared to be fully competent
witnesses. This is an abandonment of the principle that the
law must artificially redress the inequality between parties,
arising from the death of one of them. Consider the issue
devisavit vel non. One of the contestants claims as heir. About his
being this there can be no dispute. The other claims through
the will. The legatee is himself dead, and his administrator is
concerned to establish the will. The death of the legatee may
make important evidence in support of the will impossible.
The heir may fabricate evidence showing fraud on the testator,
his unsoundness of mind, etc. There is no equality.
The obscurity of the statute is illustrated by the inability
of the courts to arrive at any clear views upon it. In issues
devisavil vel non, the contestants" are always, on one side the
legatees or devisees, who claim under the will; and on the other
side, the next of kin or heirs who claim despite the will. In
such an issue, the act expressly says that all persons shall be
competent witnesses. In other issues concerning the property
of the dead, when parties claim by devolution, they are competent witnesses. In Munson v. Crookston5 there was an ejectment by the devisee of Agnes Crookston, against her husband
who claimed to be tenant by the curtesy, and refused to abide
3
American Life Ins. Co. v. Shultz, 82 Pa. 46; Hostetter v. Shalk, 85
Pa. 220.
4Hamill v. Royal Arcanum, 152 Pa. 537.
5219 Pa. 419.
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by the will. It was necessary for the plaintiff to prove that he
was not entitled to curtesy. He attempted to do this by proof
that Crookston had deserted his wife for a year or more. Crookston was allowed to testify, as to matters that had occurred during his wife's lifetime, and he recovered. The supreme court,
affirming the judgment because the plaintiff had not given evidence sufficient to establish the' desertion, said that Crookston
should not have been allowed to testify. The reason is remarkable. The husband was claiming by descent. The plaintiff
was claiming under the will; "that is, by purchase."
"Had
the plaintiff claimed as heir or next of kin" says the court,.' 'he
would have claimed by devolution, as the husband did, and
both would have been competent witnesses under the exceptions
quoted. But as the case stands, their claims are of different
classes, and they are not within the exception of the statute."
Yet, as we have said, on every issue devisavit vel non, one party
claims under a will, and the other under the intestate law. It
is impossible to understand the consistency of such a decision,
with the statute.
We may adopt the opinion of Prof. Wigmore: "As a matter
of policy [the question is only one of policy] this survival of
the now discarded interest-qualification is deplorable in every
respect, for it is based on a fallacious and exploded principle,
it leads to as much or more false decision than it prevents, and
it encumbers the profession with a confused mass of barren
quibbles over the interpretation of mere words.'"' He suggests
that instead of disqualifying the survivor, it would be better to
require that his testimony should have some corroboration, as
in Canada and New Mexico, or to allow the use- of any extant
writings or declarations of the deceased party on the subject in
issue, as in Connecticut and Oregon.
The 6th section enacts that any witness who is incompetent
by reason of interest, shall "become fully competent for either
party by a release or extinguishment in good faith of his interest." Why he should become competent for the party to
whom his interest was antagonistic, by losing the antagonism,
is not very clear. As he was already competent to testify for
such party, the expression that he shall become so, by release
etc., is not very felicitous.
61 Evidence, 708.
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The antagonistic interest renders the witness incompetent
to testify in such a way as to support that interest. The removal
of that interest ought to remove the incompetency. The interest
of the witness may be of different sorts, and an interest of one
sort may be removed in one way, and, of another sort, in another
way. The interest may be a right to land, chattels, money.
That interest could be extinguished by releasing the land or
chattels, or the debt, to the party against whom the interest operates. The creditor could release to his debtor, and so extinguish the debt. The dominant owner of land could release an
easement to the servient owner. A legatee could release
The right might be transthe legacy to the executor.!
ferred to another and thus the adverse interest of the witness
be ended. A son e. g. may assign to another, his interest in
his father's estate, and so lose the interest.8 One entitled to
money which is charged on land may transfer his claim.' One
One partentitled to share in a fund, may assign his share.'0
ner may transfer to the other partner, his interest in a debt due
the firm." The interest may be in land. One of two cotenants,
may assign his fractional right to the other." It is possible for
a witness to have several distinguishable interests which are
adverse. The extinction of one, not extinguishing the others,
would leave the witness still disqualified. A, during his life,
had transferred by gift, land to his son B. After A's death C
sued the executor for a debt existing when the gift was made.
B has two separate interests to defeat the action. If it is defeated the estate of A, in which he will share, will be larger.
He will also be able to keep the land .given to him. His transfer of his share in the estate, leaves him still interested to prevent recovery, in order to preserve the land. Hence to complete his rehabilitation, it would be necessary for him to cease
to be interested in the land as well as in the estate left by A.
To assign the share in the latter would not be enough." A
-Walls v. Walls, 182 Pa. 226; Cobb v. Cobb, 4 Super. 273.
8
Semple v. Callery, 184 Pa. 95 Cf. Verstine v. Yeaney, 210 Pa.'109.
'Miller v. Withers, 188 Pa. 128.
'"Gunster v. Jessup, 196 Pa. 548. The payee of a note may transfer
the note without liability for the collection of the amount, and so become
competent to prove its genuiness; Fritz's Estate, 3 Super. 33.
"Darragh v. Stevenson, 183 Pa. 397.
12 Turner v. Warren, 160 Pa. 336; Parry v. Parry, 130 Pa. 94.
"Keener v. Zartman, 144 Pa. 179.

30

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

may have a right to share in the assets of an insolvent corporation. He may also have made himself liable to its creditors.
His transfer of his right to share the assets, would leave untouched his liability, which only creditors could release. Hence
he is not rendered competent to testify for the assignee of the
corporation in a suit on the official bond of officers, success in
which will increase the assets, and thus lessen the amount of
debts for which he will be liable, by his assigning his right to
share in the assets."
The interest may be in the form of a liability which the
testimony of the witness will obliterate, or prevent from maturing. If A transfers a chattel, impliedly warranting his title,
his testimony in a suit involving the title of his vendee, may
produce a verdict which will prevent his liability on the warranty from maturing. In order to obliterate his interest, a release from his obligations as warrantor, would have to be made
by the vendee."5
The act of 1887 speaks of a "release or extinguishment in
good faith of his interest."
In Darragh v. Stevenson 6 the observations of Mitchell, J., showed that he was disposed to put
so illiberal an interpretation on these words, as would have made
an assignment a non-permissible mode of rehabilitation. A re
lease or extinguishment, he discovers, is not an assignment.
But, satisfying himself that the expression in "good faith"
could not be appropriate to a release or extinguishment, but would
be appropriate to an assignment, he concludes that the language
of the act "seems to imply some latitude in the sense in which
these words were used." Since the aim of the act was to restore A's competency by his divesting himself of any interest
that could be promoted by his testimony, and since this divestiture is as complete when the interest has passed to another, as
when it is abolished by release, in which case another as really
gains an advantage, as in the case of an assignment, the judicial
scruple seems somewhat fastidious. We may accept it as law
that an assignment, not less than a release, which leaves no interest in the witness, will restore his competency."
"Gunster v. Jessup, 196 Pa. 548.
'15f. Smith v. Rishel, 164 Pa. 181.

16183 Pa. 397.
'Verstine v. Yeaney, 210 Pa. 100. Turner v. Warren, 160 Pa. 336.
Parry v. Parry. 130 Pa. 94. Semple v. Callery, 184 Pa. 95. Miller v.
Withers, 188 Pa. 128.
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The release or extinguishment must be made in "good
faith." It is conceivable that a release should be drawn up, in
order to impose on the court, for the purpose of inducing it to
admit the releasee as a witness, and not for the purpose of really
putting an end to the obligation or liability released. Such a
release would be held to be wanting in "good faith." But, the
courts have gradually reached the conclusion, after much oscillation, that an assignment or release is wanting in good faith,
if, although really intended to terminate or pass the interest, it
would not have been made had it been possible for the witness
otherwise to have, testified. Releasing or extinguishing in good
faith, says Mitchell, J., "means that it shall not have been
done merely tQ evade the disqualification of the law. "'" The law
says one who is interested at the time of being invited to testify
adversely to the dead person, shall be incompetent. To get rid
of this interest, in order not to fall within the operation of the
law, is to "evade the law" ! The law punishes for obtaining
goods by means of false pretences; to obtain goods by true
representation is to evade the law! The law forbids acts in
which three ingredients exist, a, b and c. To do an act which
omits c, is to evade the law! The law says, you must not have
an interest when you testify. If then you put away that interest, and thus get into the class of the disinterested, you evade
the law, if you claim the privilege of the disinterested!
The fact is that this doctrine is a virtual abandonment of
the definition of the interest that disqualifies. Where one once
had a pecuniary or proprietary interest, with which he has
parted, he possibly, probably, has a sentimental interest. He
may have an interest in the question. He has a desire that his
releasee or assignee may win. But this desire did not constitute
at common law a disqualification. "This disqualifying interest," said Greenleaf,'" "however, must be some legal, certain
and immediate interest, however minute, either in the event of
the cause itself, or in the record, as an instrument of evidence,
in support of his own claims, in a subsequent action. It must
be a legal interest, as distinguished from the prejudice or bias
resulting from friendship or hatred, or from consanguinity, or
any other domestic or social or any official relation, or any other
motives by which men are generally influenced; for these go
'sDarragh v. Stevenson, 183 Pa. 397.
19Vol. 1, 528, 15th Edit.

Morgan v. Coal Co. 215 Pa. 443.
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only to the credibility. Thus a servant is a competent witness
for his master, a child for his parent, a poor dependent for his
patron, an accomplice for the government and the like. Even
a wife has been held admissible against a prisoner, though she
believed that his conviction would save her husband's life."
"The true test of the interest of the witness" he says again2
"is, that he will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment or that the record will be legal
evidence for or against him in some other action."
If then the
sentimental interest which one who has parted with a right has
in the successful assertion of it by his releasee or assignee, was
not, at common law a ground of disqualification, why has it
been made so by judicial interpretation? We have been told
repeatedly, that the object of the legislation concerning witnesses was, not to introduce new causes of incompetency, but
to reduce their number.
The attitude taken by the courts is in opposition to the former
practice of a century. It was a usual phenomenon, in the trial
of causes, for a witness to qualify himself at the table by a release or assignment for the very purpose and for no other, of removing his disability.
Said Greenleaf"' "The competency of a witness, disqualified
by interest, may always be restored by a proper release. If it
consists in an interest vested in himself, he may divest himself
of it by a release, or.other proper conveyances. If it consists
in a liability over, whether to the party calling him or to another
person, it may be released by the person to whom he is liable.
A release, to qualify a witness, must be given before the testimony is closed, or it comes too late. But if the
trial is not over, the court will permit the witness to be reexamined, after he is released; and it will generally be sufficient to
ask him if his testimony, already given, is true; the circumstances under which it has been given going only to the credibility.'"
It is to be regretted that an effort should be made to perpetuate the innovation on the common law made by Post v.
Avery and its successors, in the application of the act of 1887.
The 4th section of that act is as explicit as possible, that no interest and no policy shall exclude a witness, except in cases
2'Ibid. p. 530.
21 Evidence, 560; 15thEdit.
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within clause (e) of section 5. The courts have partially nullified this provision, by saying that the policy of law shall prevail,
that when interest is divested for the purpose of testifying, the
bias arising from the former interest shall not merely- discredit
but disqualify.
The courts having decided that an assignment made for the
purpose of removing a testimonial disqualification, is ibsofacto
not made in good faith, have not irrationally decided that an
assignment or release made shortly before the trial, is made
for that purpose. In Darragh v. Stevenson2 Mitchell, J., remarked, "the assignment was not made until the case was at
issue, and on the very eve of trial. It is impossible to resist
the conclusion that its real purpose was to evade the law and to
give the plaintiff's claim that advantage against the dead man's
The assignment
estate which the statute intends to prevent."
being made a few days before a second trial, was, says Fell, J.,
"evidently not in that good faith which the statute requires, but
for the sole purpose of enabling the witness to sustain the
action by his testimony." " The same has been said, when the
assignment was made on the very day on which the witness
It required some time for
was offered2 ' or on the day before.'
the courts to reach this conclusion however. In Walls v. Walls'
a release made two years after the action was brought, was able
1
the
to make Judge Bucher competent. In Parry v. Parry"
ejectment was brought in 1884. The trial occurred April 21st,
1886. A deed made by one co-tenant to the other, on March
rOth, 1886, was said by Mitchell, J., to make the grantor competent. An assignment made on the very day of the trial failed
to qualify the assignor, because it did not embrace all his interest, in Keener v. Zartman.'
Whether the release or extingnishment was in "good faith"
is to be decided by the court. "Of which good faith" says the
6th section, "the trial judge shall decide as a preliminary quesThe trial judge does not need explicitly to decide that
tion."
22183 Pa. 397.
3 Gunster v. Jessup, 196 Pa. 548.
" 4Verstine v. Yeaney, 210 Pa. 109.
2Matthews v. Matthews, 11 Super. 381.
2
8182 Pa. 226.

2130 Pa. 94.
144 Pa. 179.
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there was good faith. In permitting the witness to be sworn,
he in effect determines the good faith of the assignment.'
When
the court rejects the witness, who has made an assignment or
release the supreme court will consider that it does so, because it
has found it not to have been made in good faith. 0 The trial
court cannot be required, by a request for instructions to the
jury, to submit the good faith of the assignment made by the
witness whom it has allowed to testify, to the jury."' According
to Porter, William W. J., the appellate court may overrule
the judgment of the trial judge, who has allowed the witness to
testify"2 although the Act of 1887 says the trial judge shall decide.
The want of care in drawing up the Act of 1887 is manifest
in the duplication of the provision for calling the antagonist
party or witness, as on cross-examination. The first part of
section 6 is substantially repeated by the 7th section. One incompetent under clause e to testify for himself if a party, or for
one of the parties, may be called by the opposite party to testify
against his interest. If he is so called he becomes fully competent, not merely for the party calling him, but for himself as a
party, or if he is not a party, for the party whose interest is
consonant with his own. The 7th section is simply somewhat
more explicit. These provisions rest on the principle which
decisions had recognized, that when a party called an incompetent witness, whether the opposite party or not, he estopped
himself from alleging his incompetency, when the witness subsequently testified for himself, or, not being a party, for the
party opposite to the one who first called him.'
It is late in
the day to challenge the foundation upon which such decisions
rest. C. J. Gibson's suggestions may be accepted as being as
good as any that can be made. By calling a witness, the proponent alleges that he is worthy of credit. "Or did he assert
no more" asks the justice, "than that he was worthy of credit
only when he testified against his own interest? The man who
is honest enough to declare the whole truth when it makes
"Turner v. Warren, 160 Pa. 336.
3
Morgan v. Coal Co., 215 Pa. 443.
31Sample v. Callery, 184 Pa. 96.
32Matthews v. Matthews, 11 Super. 381.
3Floyd v. Bovard, 6 W. & S. 75; Stokes v. Demuth, 7 W. 41; Turner
v. Waterson, 4 W. & S.175; Seip v. Storch, 52 Pa. 210.
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against him, will be honest enough to declare no more than the
truth in his own favor." These remarks are wanting in cogency.
When A calls B, who is the opposite party or has an opposite
interest, he does not say that he is worthy of credit. He takes
the risk, and is known by the court and jury, to take the risk of
the falsity of the answers. Perhaps he can do no better, having
no safer witnesses, than to take this risk. Suppose the answer
is unfavorable to the party calling the witness. Then the jury
perceives that the proponent has been disappointed. The proponent hoped that he would tell the truth, as he conceives it,
and his hope has been defeated. By what logic can it be said
that the proponent, in such a case has declared the witness
worthy of credit? How unreasonable to say that by calling a
hostile witness, in hope that he will tell the truth, his incompetency, founded on the probability that he would, under the
stress of interest, lie for himself, is swept away? By saying
that the witness will possibly tell a truth which is inimical to
himself, the party calling him does not say that he will probably
tell the truth, when he makes assertions that are friendly to
himself.
But the 7th section contains a prodigious extension of the
principle in question. If A, plaintiff, calls one of three, four,
five, six co-defendants, he not only makes the one called competent to testify for himself and his co-defendants, but he
makes all these co-defendants competent! He cannot certify
to the believableness of one, without certifying to that of all!
It is difficult to conceive a greater absurdity. Veracity, instead
of being the attribute of an individual, becomes the attribute of
a group, or groups fortuitously combined, in the exigencies of
business. If one of the group is honest, all his associates become possessed of that admirable virtue!
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MOOT COURT
WM. MAJOR v. TUBERCULOSIS ASSOCIATION.
Bill in Equity tc Restrain Erection of Hospital-Nuisance.
Fritz for Plaintiff.
Mendelsohn for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
LANDIS, J.-The association, a corporation, is about to erect a hospital in the Borough. It will be within 1000 feet of 20 residences. It is
designed to accommodate 100 patients. This is a bill to enjoin the erection and maintenance of the hospital by fifteen of the adjacent property
owners. It is admitted that the presence of the hospital will cause apprehension of contagion among the people and will lessen the value of the
property in the neighborhood by 33 to 50 percent.
The erection and maintenance of a hospital for the treatment of tuberculosis is not per se a nuisance. Such institutions are of great necessity owing to the prevalence of this dreadful malady. Theoretioally
there need be no apprehension of contagion by adjacent property holders,
due to proximity, for in a properly conducted hospital the tubercular
bacilli would not be permitted to escape in a virulent form. But it is admitted in this case that the presence of the hospital will cause apprehension of contagion among the people and lessen the value of property
in the neighborhood 33 to 50 percent.
"Whatever worketh hurt or inconvenience or damage is a nuisance."
(2 Pa. 114). A nuisance is anything which causes hurt, inconvenience or
annoyance to lands, tenements or hereditaments of another, or to the
reasonable enjoyment of the same (10 Phila. 356; 34 C. C. 537). So we
are safe in stating, the act contemplated will constitute a nuisance and
as such may be enjoined.
This association is incorporated and proposes to act by virtue of a
charter granted by the state legislature. But there is no proof of an
actual necessity to locate on the proposed site to the depreciation of adjoining property. It is not shown that the needs of this community demand such hospital. It has been said that there is danger of inoculation
merely in walking on the "Strand," so in any populous community, apprehension of contagion is reasonable, where sufferers are introduced
into a community otherwise immune.
A low estimate places death rate from consumption at one-seventh
of humanity. It is now conceded to be a contagious and infectious disease. There are free dispensaries provided by the state for indigent patients, and hospitals comparatively free, for sufferers in a more advanced
stage. Modern methods of treatment require a high altitude in an isolated district. "Question then is whether, as viewed by people generally, this disease is not regarded with dread so as to deter persons from
living in vicinity" (87 Md. 352). Act 1903 Pa. Law Sect 33 cited by de-
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fendant empowers cities of second class to eredt hospitals without their
corporate limits, for treatment of certain classes of disease. It would
be a novel construction indeed to infer from this authority to erect hospital in a borough.
It is not shown that this is a charitable institution and we infer it
is for corporate gain. The balance of injury principle is usually applied
on an ex parte showing, in preliminary injunctions. One may not injure
his neighbor on the ground of advantage to self. That the maintenance
of this hospital will impair value of property by destroying physical comfort and menacing health and will therefore be actionable at law, cannot
be questioned, but the injury would be of a continuous nature and the
remedy at law would not be efficacious.
It is sufficient to constitute anything a common nuisance, that a
number of persons are seriously annoyed. It is not necessary that all
the neighbors be affected.
We decree, therefore, that a bill be framed with an injunction to restrain the association from erecting hospital contemplated, within the
borough or its immediate environs.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
In the evolution of the law of nuisance there has grown an element
not clearly recognized in the early cases. This element is the comfortable
enjoyment of one's property. In the present case the plaintiff insists
that the location of a sanitarium for the treatment of a disease, of which
there is a positive dread which science has so far failed to combat, so far
robs them of that pleasure in, and comfortable enjoyment of their homes
as to make it a nuisance and furthermore that the depreciation of the
value of their property by the location of the hospital is such a deprivation of property as will warrant a decre e in their favor under the maxim
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.
The defendant contends that there is no actual danger and that the
fear of the plaintiffs is unfounded and unsustained by science and that
therefore the courts should take no account of it.
The opinion of the court is that, if the dread and fear of the disease
induced by the proximity of the hospital wll in fact disturb the com
fortable enjoyment of the property of the plaintiffs and is shared by the
whole community to such an extent that the value of the neighboring
property is materially affected thereby, the right of the plaintiffs to an
injunction cannot be denied because this fear and dread may be scientifically unfounded.
The question is, not whether the fear is founded in science but
whether it generally prevails to such an extent as to affect the movement
and conduct of men. Fear is one of the most common of human emotions and no good reason is discovered why it should not furnish a ground
for injunctive relief. The fear of contagion in the present case may according to the theories and dogmas of scientific merit, be unfounded,
but such theories and dogmas are not controlling unless shared by the
people generally.
In the case of Baltimore v. Fairfield Imp. Co. 87 Md. 352, 40 L. R.
A. 494, an injunction against placing a leper in a residential district for

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
care and restraint was justified upon the ground that the disease caused
fear and terror in the minds of ordinary individuals. The court said, "It
is not so much a mere academic inquiry as to whether the disease is in
fact highly or remotely contagious; but the question is whether, viewed
as it is by the people generally, its introduction into the neighborhood is
calculated to do a serious injury to the property of the plaintiff."
In
Stotler v. Rochelle (Kan.) 109 Pac. 188, the maintenance of a hospital
for cancer was enjoined. The court said that the question was not
whether the establishment of the hospital would place the occupant of
adjacent dwellings in actual danger 6f infection but whether in view of
the general dread inspired by the disease the reasonable enjoyment
of the adjoining properties would be materially interfered with.
Finally, in Cherry v. Williams, 147 N. C. 452, and Everett v. Paschall,
(Wash.) 110 Pac. 879 injunctions were granted enjoining the maintenance
of hospital for tuberculosis.
These cases are on all fours with the present case and the decisions
and opinions furnish abundant authority and reason for granting an injunction in the present case.
Judgment affirmed.

JOHN TILBERRY v. SOLOMON DEEK.
Tresspass for Damages-

Continuous Nuisance

-Liability

of

Grantor-Statute of Limitations.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Deek owned land through which a stream flowed, and Tilberry land
immediately above it on the same stream. Deek erected a dam upon his
land not far from the division line, effect of which has been to flow the
water back upon Tilberry's land. The dam was erected twenty years
ago and nine years ago Deek sold his land to one McFarlane by whom the
dam has since been maintained. Action is for damages suffered six
years prior'to suit.
Warrington for Plaintiff.
Badger for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
WATKINS, J.-The question which the court has to decide is,
whether a right of action for damages still exists in Tilberry after having
remained silent for twenty years and is the action properly brought
against the former owner?
There is no doubt that the flowing of this water back upon the
plaintiff's land constituted a nuisance, for it is held in 4 Brewster 333, the
flooding of grounds or the flowing of water back upon another's land,
constitutes a nuisance.
There is no doubt that this is a continuing nuisance, for as each day
passes by, the plaintiff's land is still covered with water to his damage.
In 3 Black. Com. 220, it is said that every continuance of a nuisance is
held to be a fresh one and that, therefore, a fresh action will lie.
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It seems to be the well settled rule that the creator of a nuisance or
one who more remotely, either by negligence or design, furnishes the
means and facility for the commission of any injury to another, which
would not have been done without him, is responsible.
One who erects a nuisance on his land cannot escape liability for
damages caused thereby, by a conveyance of the property, and his liability
extends to a continuance of the nuisance subsequent to his conveyance.
29 Cyc. 1204.
It is settled that a person who is injured by a continuing nuisance
may maintain an action against the original tort feasor, who creates it,
or against any grantee who continues it after a request and refusal to
abate. 132 Mass. 486, 9 N. H. 88. 3 Allen 264.
It was settled in Roswell v. Prior, 12 Mod. 635, that the grantor
himself is liable, notwithstanding his grant, for the continuance.
In that case the plaintiff had recovered against the defendant for
erecting a building which stopped the plaintiff's ancient lights. The defendant had granted over the ground with the nuisance to another and
contended that he was no longer liable, but that the action should be
against the grantee. But the Court said, "Surely this action is well
brought against the creator, for before his grant over he was liable for
all consequential damages, and it shall not be in his power to discharge
himself by granting it over."
In 70 Iowa 145, it was held, where one company built a permanent
dam across a river, and caused water to flow back on plaintiff's land, and
after the dam was completed, sold it, and the vendee has done no act except to maintain the dam; that where a nuisance is of a permanent nature, all the damages caused thereby are deemed to accrue at once upon
its becoming such, and a party injured can recover all damages past and
prospective, and that against the grantor.
It appears to be the law of Wisconsin that in order to hold the
creator of a nuisance liable after it has passed to his grantee, it must be
shown that he is deriving some benefit from its continuance or that he
sold with a warranty of the continued use of the property as enjoyed
while the nuisance existed.
While it does not appear that this land was conveyed with covenants
of warranty, yet the Lower Court is led to believe that the vendee was
led into paying a higher price for advantages afforded by this dam, for
we see that nineteen years after the sale of this land, he still continued
the dam. And is it not fair that the vendor should pay damages when
he got rid of his land and obtained a higher price than he would otherwise have received?
Supposing that the grounds had been taken by the defendant that
this suit was barred by the statute of limitations, the defense could not
have been maintained, for each continuance being a new nuisance, and
this action being brought within six years, the plaintiff is entitled to recover. 5 Met. 205.
Plaintiff is entitled to six years' damages.
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OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
It is a general rule established by many reported cases that the creator of a nuisance does not by conveying the property to a third person
release himself from liability for the continuation of the nuisance.
This is especially true where the grantor conveys his property by
warranty deed. Thus in Waggonerv. Germaine, 3 Denio 306 it is held that
if one erects a nuisance on his own land, as, for example obstructing a
water course, to the injury of the land of another, and then conveys the
premises to a purchaser with warranty he nevertheless remains liable for
the damages incurred by the continuance of the nuisance subsequent to
the conveyance. And in Lohmiller v. Ind. Ford Water Co. 51 Wis. 913,
the same doctrine is asserted.
The same rule has been applied in cases where it does not appear
that the grantee conveyed the premises with warranty. Thus in Curlice
v. Thompson, 19 N. H. 471, it was held that a party who erects a dam that
is a nuisance continues liable as long as it exists and is not released from
such liability by a sale of the premises. To the same effect are Plumer v.
Harper, 3 N. H. 88. Dorman v. Ames, 12 Minn. 451; Hyde Light Co. v.
Porter, 167 Ill. 276. Jordan v. Helwig, 1 Wilson, Super. Ct. (Ind.) 447.
Eastman v. Amoskeag, 44 N. H. 143.
In Pennsylvania it has been held that an owner of real estate cannot
by leasing the same to a tenant avoid liability to a third party for the
continuance of a nuisance which existed at the time of the lease. Kraus
v. Brua, 107 Pa. 85. It was the duty of the owner to see "that the
property before it passed out of his possession was in such a condition
that its use would not be injurious to his neighbor."
It has also been held that a party who caused a nuisance by acts done
on the lands of another is liable for its continuance and that it is no defence that he cannot enter to abate without exposing himself to an action of tresspass. Smith v. Elliott, 9 Pa. 345.
Upon the precise question involved in this case there seems to have
been no Pennsylvania decision, but in view of the rule prevailing in
other jurisdictions and the analogies presented by the above cases there
would seem to be little doubt that the defendant should be held liable.
The defendant had not acquired a right to maintain the nuisance by
prescription. The period of prescription in Pennsylvania is twenty-one
years. Strickler v. Todd, 10 S.& R. 63; P. & L. Dig. Dec. vol. 14 c.
24039.
Judgment affirmed.

ISAIAH READING v. COHOCTON TOWNSHIP.
Trespass for Damages-Negligence of Supervisors in Maintaining Highways-Liability of Townships.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
A road at a ceirtain point was but twelve feet wide. On one side
was a declivity six feet deep. A guard rail had been maintained at the
top of the declivity, until four weeks before the accident about to be de-
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scribed, when it was torn down by somebody. Reading was driving a
carriage with two horses when a large newspaper dropped from a carriage in advance of him, was lifted to the wind from the ground, opened,
its sheets separated. His horses took fright and attempting to turn,
threw the vehicle over the embankment. Reading sustained serious injuries. The vehicle was demolished and one of the horses so hurt that it
had to be killed, This is trespass for damages for all these injuries and
losses against the township.
McCall for Plaintiff.
Storey for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
PEPPETS, J.-This is an action against the township for damages
sustained as a result of the negligence of the supervisors and it can
rightfully be brought against said defendants. The 6th section of the
act of 1836 provides, that the public roads shall be effectually opened and
constantly kept in repair, and at all seasons shall be kept clear of all impediments to easy and convenient passing and traveling, at the expense
of the township, as the law shall direct. For any wilful or wanton failure to discharge these duties the supervisors are personally liable, and
the township is responsible in damages to those who suffer injury from
their neglect. (5 W. & S. 545).
According to the act of 1836, a suit may be well brought against the
supervisors, because the duty of maintaining and repairing roads is
thrown upon them. But although the officers may be held personally,
yet the township may be held also. The supervisors, who are elected by
the inhabitants and answerable to them, are agents of the corporation.
And upon this principle of principal and agent the township is liable for
any injury caused by the negligence of the supervisdrs. It was so held
in Dean vs. New Milford Township, 5 W. & S. 545.
That the supervisors were negligent in not repairing the guard rail is
evident. It is so conceded by the defendant. Sufficient time elapsed to
give them notice of the absence of the guard-rail.
The important question in this case is:-Was negligence of defendant's servants the proximate cause of the injury? "To sustain an action
for damages for an injury caused by the alleged negligence of another,
the injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the negligence; such a consequence as under the surrounding circumstances of the
case might and ought to have been foreseen by the wrongdoer and
likely to flow from his act." (177 Pa. 213 and 29 Cyc. 492-3.)
Now this question presents itself. Was it such a consequence as under the circumstances ought to have been foreseen and provided against?
Defendant contends that the injury was caused by an extraordinary outside cause concurring with defect in highway, and, therefore, the township is not liable. We cannot agree with him. On the contrary we
think that the fright of the horse was ordinary, and to be expected; that
his conduct when in fright would be insane was also to be expected.
The supervisor knew or ought to have known, that any horse which
took fright at that particular point, might easily, and probably would,
throw the vehicle over the bank, for the road was only 12 feet wide.
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The fact could have been foreseen in this case that, by reason of the absence of a railing, the vehicle of a traveler on the road was exposed to
danger, upon the occurrence of almost infinite combinations of circumstances, of being driven or thrown over the bank.
29 Cyc. 495 says, "Where an act is negligent it is not necessary to
render it the proximate cause that the person committing it could or
might have foreseen the particular consequence or precise form of the
injury, or the particular manner in which it occurred, if by the exercise of reasonable care it might have been foreseen or anticipated that
some injury might result."
In 81 Pa. 44, it was held: "If the road is so dangerous, by reason of
its proximity to a precipice, or any other cause that common prudence
require extra precaution, in order to insure the safety of the travelling
public, the municipal authorities are bound to use such precaution." It
was said in the case of Lower Macungie Township vs. Merkhoffer, 21 P.
F. Smith 276, "a highway must be kept in such repair that even skittish
animals may be employed without risk or danger.on it."
The case of Burrell Township v. Uncapher, 117 Pa. 353, is very
similar to this. A horse and wagon were being driven down a hillside
road. At the right side of the road coming down the grade was a steep
declivity, unguarded by barriers. Arriving at a point near the foot of
the hill, the horse suddenly took fright at a steam thresher standing at
the roadside, and sprang to the right, partly over the declivity, becoming
altogether unmanageable; he made a second plunge and went over the
precipice, upturning the wagon, and injuring the persons therein. The
township was held liable. The court said that "The immediately producing cause of the accident, in the present case, was the unguarded condition of the roadside at the place where the accident occurred. If that
unguarded condition of the roadside was an act of negligence on the part
of the defendant, it follows that defendant is responsible. (See also 79
Ia. 204; 25 Ia. 108.)
In view of the foregoing principles of law, the facts applicable,
judgment is hereby given for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
There are many cases in Pennsylvania in which the liability of municipalities and townships for injuries occasioned by frightened horses
going over unguarded embankments has been asserted. Township v.
Merkhoffer, 71 Pa. 276; Township v. Davis, 77 Pa. 317; Hay v. Philadelphia, 81 Pa. 44; Yoders v. Township, 172 Pa. 447; Bitting v. Township,
172 Pa. 213; Davis v. Township, 196 Pa. 273.
In Boone v. Township, 192 Pa. 206, it is held that "it is the duty of
the supervisors to anticipate that accidents arising from the fright of
horses may result in the ordinary use of a highway for purposes of
travel, and if they neglect this duty by failing to erect guard rails at
dangerous places, and an accident happens at such a place from the
fright of a horse, unmixed with any element of contributory fault on the
part of the owner of the horse, the neglect of the supervisors is the
proximate cause of the accident and a verdict may be recovered against
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the township."
This case is followed and approved in Davis v. Township, 196 Pa. 273.
The leading case on the subject is Yoders v. Township, 172 Pa. 447.
In this case the doctrine that the township is liable is unequivocally announced and the reasons for holding the township liable clearly stated.
It is true that there are cases in which it has been held to have been
the duty of the court to declare as a matter of law that the negligent
ommission to provide a guard rail at a point like that in question, although concurring with the fright of the horse was not the proximate
cause of the injury. Many of these cases are collected in Card v. Township, 191 Pa. 254. For the most part they were decided upon the ground
that it appeared in the presentation of the plaintiff's own case that the
accident was produced by an intervening or independent or unrelated
cause, the happening of which the defendant could not reasonably be expected to foresee and provide against, as for example, the breaking of
traces, (Wilkes v. Township, 183 Pa. 184; Card v. Township, 191 Pa. 254),
the giving away of hold-backs (Habecker v. Township, 9 Super. 553),
the choking of a horse by too small a collar (Township v. Phillips, 122 Pa.
601), or his fright from an extraordinary cause at a point distant from
the point of accident (Schaeffer v. Township, 150 Pa. 145). They are,
therefore, not determinative of the present case.
A piece of paper lying in the road is not an unusual incident; and that
"when stirred by the wind" it will "startle and sometimes render a horse
uncontrollable" has been judicially asserted to be one of the things which
the supervisors are bound to foresee (Yoders v. Township).
The liability of the township is not dependent upon the knowledge of
the supervisors of the presence upon the highway of the object which
caused the fright of the horse. The township may be held liable although the supervisors did not know of and had no oppurtunity to discover, the presence on the highway of the object which caused the fright.
Davis v. Township, 196 Pa. 273. The fact that the object was placed upon
the highway by a third person is also immaterial. Davis v. Township,
supra, Trout v. Turnpike Road, 216 Pa. 110.
Judgment affirmed.

JONES ESTATE.
Decedent's Estate7-Construction of Wills-Distribution of Trust
Funds-Rule Governing Payment of Annuities.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
John Jones devised real and personal property to "X" in trust to
pay $8000 per year from the annual profits to his son William and any
balance to his son Charles. He directed also that no profits should be
paid to Charles until William should. have received $8000 for each year
following his death. At the death of William he directed that the trust
should be continued till William's youngest child became adult and that
then one half of the estate should be conveyed to the children. Seven
years after the testator's death, William died leaving a son ten years

44

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

aid. William had received nothing. The estate had not produced any
profits during the seven years and William had received nothing. Immediately after his death it became exceedingly profitable, the net profits of
the first year being $45,000. William's son claims the whole of it through
his guardian. William died heavily indebted and his administrators claim
the fund; Charles claims that after deducting $8000 for the child the balance should go to him.
Miss Long, for William's son.
Marshall, for Administrator.
Landis, for Charles.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
is a well settled rule, both in Pennsylvania and in
ROOKE, J.-It
other states, that in all cases involving a distribution under a will, the
controlling feature is the intention of the testator. Shubart's Estate,
154 Pa. 230; Graham's Executors v. Graham, 66 Pa. 407; Dalrymple's
Estate, 13 Superior 789; Ambert's Appeal, 119 Pa. 48; Rogers v. Rogers,
7 Watts 15.
Therefore, we must first look to see what the intention of the testator was in the case at bar. Clearly, we think, the testator intended,
that, after William's death, the trust should be kept alive and the annuity paid to his children until the youngest of them should have become
adult. Therefore, before we look further into the case, we will direct
the trustee to pay to the guardian of William's son, the sum of $8000.
He is clearly entitled to this from the profits, as his father would have
been had he been alive.
The only remaining question, therefore, is as to the distribution of
the remainder of the fund, i. e., $37,000.
The following question is now raised for our determination: Can the
excess income of the fund for any one year be applied to the payment of
a deficit in the annuities of a preceding year or years?
The rule seems to be, in Pennsylvania at least, that where arrears
of the annuity arise, by reason of a deficit in any of the years, the income of subsequent years cannot be applied to the payment of such arrears, where the will contains no directions to that effect and in fact
negatives such intention by a disposition of the excess. Brewster's Appeal, 7 Sadler, 604; Sells Estate, 4 W. N. C. 14; Contra, Rudolph's Appeal, 10 Pa. 34.
The case of Rudolph's Appeal cited above as contrary to the doctrine
above stated, is criticized in the case of Sells Estate, 4 W. N. C. 14.
The court in that case said: "It will be noticed that the case of Fosterv.
Smith, so much relied upon by the court in deciding Rudolph's Appeal,
was subsequently reversed in a later English case." Foster v. Smith
2 Yound & Colyer, 193 (reversed in 1 Philip's Chancery [Eng.] 234).
The court in the above case then says: "It would seem therefore
that the weight of English authority is in favor of the construction contended for by Mr. Mitchell. So far as the case rested on Foster against
Smith, it fell with the reversal of-that case. It will also be noticed that
Rudolph's Appeal is not in point in that there was a provision in the will
in Rudolph's Appeal that the annuity should be fully paid whereas there
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is no such provision in the case at bar. Furthermore, the instrument interpreted in Rudolph's Appeal was a deed of trust and would be construed in favor of the grantee whereas here the instrument is a will and
will be construed according to the intention of the testator."
The quotations from the above case, therefore, seem to indicate that
arrearages cannot be collected from the income of subsequent years unless there is an express direction in the will to that effect.
Was there such a direction in the will under our consideration?
We think that there was not. The only clause in the will which
could be construed as such is that, "No profits should be paid to Charles
until William should have received $8000 for each year following his
death."
The intention of the testator was, we think, to provide for both his
son William and his son Charles. He expressly directs that the trust
shall not be continued for William's benefit after his death, but directs
that it shall be continued for the benefit of William's children.
We cannot conceive that any such situation as is here presented
occurred to the testator when he made the will. He probably thought
that the fund would yield a sufficient yearly income to pay the sum of
$8000 and still leave something remaining for Charles. It is clear that he
intended that Charles should receive nothing in case the yearly income in
any one year was not sufficient to pay William's annuity but further
than this, we think, the above mentioned clause cannot be applied.
The gift of the residue to Charles is conclusive on this construction.
4 W. N. C. 14; Stellfox vs. Snyden, 1 Johns Chancery [Eng.] 234.
We, therefore, direct the trustee to pay, first: $8000 to the guardian
of William's son, and second: the remainder, $37,000, to Charles.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
This case has been argued with considerable earnestness by all the
parties concerned, each of whom has called our attention to adjudicated
cases in support of their respective contentions. As the question involved is one which is dependent upon the construction to be given to the
language of the testator as indicative of his intent, it was to be expected
that we should find little that is directly in point in such adjudications,
and we indeed have found little that has more than a helpful suggestiveness.
In the following cases it was held that the annuities for each year
were charged upon the income of that year and not upon the income
generally. Appeal of Brewster. 12 Atl. 470. Estate of Pierce, 56 Wis.
580; Casamajor v. Pearson, 8 C. & F. 69.
In New York the right to recover deferred payments has been recognized but in all the New York cases the wills expressly directed the annuities to be paid out of the income, without restriction and without the
word "annual" and the decisions rested upon the absence of any direction that they should be paid out of each year's income. Stewart v.
Chambers, 2 Sanf. 382; Matter of Chauncey, 119 N. Y., 119 N. Y. 77.
The present case differs from the New York cases by reason of the
fact that the annuity was directed to be paid out of the "annual profits"
and from the other cases by reason of the fact that the will contained
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the provision that "no profits should be paid to Charles until William
should have received $8,000 for each year following" the testator's death.
These words were indicative of an intention on the part of the testator
that the income of succeeding years should be applicable to the payment
of a previous deficiency. The testator had already stated that Charles
was to receive merely the balance remaining after William had received
his $8000 from the annual profits and, unless the subsequent direction is
interpreted as directing that deficiencies should be paid out of accruing income in succeeding years, it is meaningless and useless.
It is a well settled rule that a will should be so construed as to give
effect to every word and part thereof if such construction is possible
without doing violence to the obvious intention of the testator. 30 A. & E.
064.
In the present case the interpretation which we have given to the
will gives effect to all of its parts and certainly is not inconsistent with any
clearly expressed intention of the testator.
The $37,000 should have been awarded to William.

PHILLIPS v. ROHRER.
Sale of Lands-Breach of Condition-Measure of Damages.
O'Hara for Plaintiff.
Rogers for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
DORN, J.-Rohrer owned two adjacent houses. He offered to sell
one of them to Phillips for $15,000. Phillips agreed to take it at that
price if Rohrer would remove, within six months, a privy which stood in
the yard of the other house, otherwise he would pay but $12,000 for it.
Rohrer agreed to remove the privy and the contract was consummated.
A year went by but Rohrer did not perform his promise. This is an action for $3,000 damages.
It is a well established principle of the courts in construing contracts
to carry out as far as is possible the intention of the parties by the
agreements into which they have entered. With this principle in view the
court proceeds to ascertain what was the intention of the parties in this
case. The existence of this intent is shown by the fact that different
prices were stipulated for the removal of, or the failure to remove the
privy in question. Reason would seem to dictate that it was an alternative offer,-either to receive $15,000 if the grantor perform the condition or $12,000 if he did not perform the condition. But he agreed to
perform the condition and in reliance upon this agreement the plaintiff paid
him $15,000. The removal of the privy was a consideration for the extra
$3,000, and there having been a failure of the consideration-and the
money being paid,-there is no obstacle in the way of its recovery, for it
is a well settled principle requiring no authority to support it, that whenever there is failure of consideration the money parted with may be recovered. If a person receives a sum of money for the performance of an
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act, and he performs the act, he is entitled to the money; but if he receives the money for the performance of that act and fails to perform it,
then he is not entitled to the money, and must return that which he unrightfully retains in his possession. 17 Wend (N. P.) 447; 22 Wend. (N.
Y.) 201; 11 Mass. 76; 48 Pa. 450. 22 Wend (N. Y.) 163; 4 Pick 179; 53
N. Y. 394,
The defendant contends that $3,000 is too much damages for the
breach of a contract which would have required a considerably less sum
to perform. The court cannot say what is too much or too little damage
caused by breach of this contract, for the damages are not susceptible of
definite admeasurement. The existence of the privy might reasonably
have depreciated the value of the plaintiff's property in a thickly settled
community, or it might not have had any effect upon the property at all
if the property was located in a rural district. Again, the proximity of
the privy to a dwelling house would be considered a nuisance in one case
where it would not in another. This tends to show the difficulty in measuring the damages in such a case. Here, however, no admeasurement is
necessary, for the removal of the privy was worth $3,000 to the plaintiff,
as is shown by the fact that he was willing to pay that much more in case
it was removed. Clark says in his book on Contracts: "The contract
may be entire or severable, according to the circumstances of each particular case," and "a contract is said to be divisible when it is one in
which the promise of one or both parties admits of a more or less complete performance, and the damages sustained by an incomplete performance or partial breach of which may be apportioned according to the*
the extent of failure." The extent of failure here was clearly $3,000.
Upon the question of construction of contracts, Lord Ellenborough has
remarked that it depended "not on any formal arrangement of words,
but on the reason and sense of the thing, as it is to be collected from the
whole contract and the reason and sense of the thing of this case has led
this court to the conclusion it has reached.
The defendant having received $3,000 in consideration of the performance of an act which he has failed to perform during a specified
time, judgment is hereby entered against him.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
Rohrer offered to sell the house for $15,000. Phillips made an alternative counter-offer; to take the house and pay $15,000 for it, if Rohrer
would agree to remove the privy or otherwise to pay $12,000 for it. The
first alternative of this counter-offer was accepted by Rohrer. Thus a
contract was made. The deed was delivered; and the purchase money,
$15,000 paid. The six months in which the privy was to be removed have
elapsed and the privy is still where it was. This is not an action to rescind the contract, but to obtain damages for the non performance by
Rohrer of his promise.
The contract is enforceable. It is not a contract for an interest in
land, but a contract for the doing by Rohrer, upon his land, of an act,
viz., the demolition of the offending structure.
The only question is that of the measure of damages. The learned
court below has assumed that $3,000 is the amount, because Phillips was
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willing to pay only $3,000 less than he did pay, if the privy was to remain. But Rohrer did not agree with him that the presence of the
structure would detract from the value of the house to the extent of
$3000. The one-sided estimate of Phillips cannot be adopted as the
proper measure.
The true question is: to what extent would the continuance of the privy
lessen the market value of the house. Would it lessen itby $1,000, or $2,000,
or $4,000? Phillips may be a peculiarly sensitive and fastidious man, in
whose mind the premises are worth $3,000 less than they would be. were
the object taken away. But the average man may have no such repugnance as would reduce the selling price by more than $500, or $1,000, or
$1,500.
The question, by what amount is the market value of the premises
reduced by the permanence of the privy ought to have been submitted to
the jury. Immel v. Herb, 43 Superior, 111.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.

HOBBS v. JASPER.
False Imprisonment- Contributory Negligence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Hobbs was calling at the house of Jasper on June 2, 1910, rather late
in the evening; Jasper explained that he purposed taking the late train
for New York and excused himself to pack his grip, asking Hobbs to
wait till he could attend to this. Hobbs got tired and sleepy and lay
down and fell asleep. Then the lamp went out. Jaspea was slow in
packing and when he finished, he found he had but a few minutes to
catch his train. Forgetting about Hobbs, he ran downstairs, locked the
door and caught his train. Later on reflection he began to worry about
Hobbs, particularly after noticing in the paper the fact that Hobbs had
disappeared. Upon investigation Hobbs was found in a starving condition in Jasper's home.
Saul for Plaintiff.

Stugart for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
STOREY, J.-Action for false imprisonment. According to Cooley,
page 174, "False imprisonment is an unlawful restraint upon a man's
freedom of locomotion." Pollock, page 188, defines it to be, "The infliction of any kind of detention and restraint not authorized by law."
From the definitions hereinbefore stated and the cases hereafter cited,
the intention of the party charged with the offense seems to be a principal feature of this tort. In all cases reviewed by the Court, the party
charged with the offense knew of its commission, when the false imprisonment was completed. It seems that false imprisonment is an affirmative tort and not one brought about by a non-feasance.
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In Spoor v. Spooner, 12 Metcalf, 281, we find a case analogous to
case at bar. The plaintiff, a constable of City of Boston, went on board
ship, of which defendant was roaster, with a civil process for purpose of
arresting the steward of said ship, and was carried to sea. Ship was on
point of sailing when plaintiff went on board and the sails were set. Upon
going on board, plaintiff immediately found and arrested the steward,
but remained standing with him on board ten (10) or twelve (12) minutes,
without attempting to leave the ship, notice having been given for all
persons to leave the ship. The Court held: "An action of trespass for
false imprisonment cannot be maintained against the master of a vessel,
for carrying to sea an officer who went on board to arrest a person, just
as the vessel was leaving the wharf, if plaintiff did not use diligence to
get on shore, after receiving notice that all persons not belonging on
board must leave her."
"A person cannot be imprisoned who voluntarily
places himself in a situation where another may lawfully do what results
in restraining his liberty."
In case at bar, the plaintiff voluntarily placed
himself in a position by going to sleep, where the defendant could lawfully imprison him. A man who is calling on another at the latter's
house, has no right to fall asleep and if he does so he is guilty of contributory negligence. And even if the defendant was also guilty of negligence, of which we think he was not, the plaintiff cannot recover.
"It is a settled principle with us that a plaintiff cannot recover damages
for an injury that results from a concurrence of his own negligence with
that of the defendant." Pittsburg, Ft. Wayne & Chicago R. R. Co. v.
Evans, 53 Pa. 250.
Plaintiff contends that as he was lawfully at the house of defendant,
that defendant was guilty of the false imprisonment. As to this contentention the Court in the case Spoor v. Spooner, where plaintiff contending that plaintiff being lawfully on board, the carrying away of him was
a trespass, although he had not used due diligence in getting on shore,
held "As he went on board for a special purpose, and it being proved
that plaintiff was guilty of negligence in regard to it, when he had sufficient time to leave the ship, after performing his duty, it follows no fault
attached to defendant and he cannot be charged as a trespasser, in sailing with plaintiff on board," and we think that such is the law.
"Where there was testimony that defendant obtained the prosecutor's
goods under pretense of a contract, and through a lie, even though the
defendant was not guilty of obtaining goods under false pretences, or of
embezzlement, this is such probable cause for his prosecution, as will
defeat a recovery in an action of trespass by him, against the prosecutor,
and the justice of the peace who issued the warrants upon which he was
arrested." Neal v. Hart, 115 Pa., 347. "He who has probable cause, or
in other words reasonable grounds for belief of guilt, stands acquitted of
liability." Trovis v. Smith, 1 Barr. 234. "General rule is that malice
will be inferred from the want of probable cause so far as to sustain the
action."
McCarthy v. DeArmit, 99 Pa. 63. These cases seem to
infer that reasonable cause is a defense. We believe that the defendant
had reasonable cause, at he was in a hurry to catch his train, and, upon
coming downstairs found the light out, he naturally would believe that
his guest had departed.
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In Burdick's Law of Torts, 455, we find, "Towards those expressly
or impliedly invited upon one's premises, for mutual advantage, the inAnd in Bixler v. McCready, 54
viter owes the duty of ordinary care."
Conn. 172, "Reasonable care is proportioned to the danger to be guarded
against." The Court thinks that the defendant used ordinary and reasonable care in present litigation, as the defendand had no knowledge that
plaintiff was in his house and the only danger to be guarded against was
that of leaving his house open as a prey for thieves.
We can find no Pennsylvania case which deals with involuntary imprisonment, and from the facts and dicta already stated and cited, we
must hold that plaintiff cannot recover.
Judgment for defendent.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
A man has not a right to move as he will. He is lame, his legs and
arms are broken, he is paralytic. Such a man has not the muscular and
nervous and osseous power, if the expression be allowed, to move. But no
right has been invaded. In such a case, however, he may have a rightnot
to be moved by others whither he refuses his consent to go. Cf. Ollet
v. R. R. Co. 201 Pa. 361.
He has a right not to be prevented, except under special circumstances, from moving as he will, by the purposeful act of another. If A
opposes force to B so as to prevent B's locomotion, he generally commits
a wrong to B. If A prevents B's locomotion except within a certain
area, e. g. a field, a house, a room, he violates B's right. He may violate
this right, not merely by opposing his own superior corporeal force to
B's but by offering that of external matter. Should he thrust B into a
cell, and close the door, so that B could not walk beyond it, except by
overcoming the resistance of the walls, or of the door, he would imprison
B. Cf. Hildebrand v. McCrum, 101 Ind. 61. So, if, B being within a
room, e. g. a bank, on lawful business, about the usual time for closing,
the door is locked by the teller, who is aware of his presence, and he is
detained for a half hour, he is imprisoned. Woodward v. Washburn, 3
Den. 369. Probably, if, being on a boat at a wharf, the boat is pushed
off without giving him an opportunity to step upon the wharf, he will be
imprisoned within the boat although he is not prevented except by his
fear of drowning, from stepping from it into the surrounding water.
Spoor v. Spooner, 12 Metc. 281. Hobbs was clearly imprisoned, and by
the act of Jasper. Being in Jasper's home, he had a right not to be
prevented with exceptions from leaving it. He was prevented by the
locking of the door and of all other exits.
Did the circumstances attending this prevention take from it any
tortious character? The necessity for haste, in leaving the house, did
not justify the conscious incarceration of Hobbs. But, the incarceration
was not known to be occurring at the time. The haste, the preoccupation of the mind of J. sper, or some other cause, had caused him to forget the presence of Hobbs. Must the imprisonment be intended in order
to make it "false"? The physical mischief to Hobbs is just as great,
from an unintended, as from an intended, imprisonment. The circumstances imposed on Jasper, the duty of not forgetting his presence, un-
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less that obliviscence was induced by the conduct of Hobbs himself. A
man cannot escape the duty of compensating another for an injurious
act, by alleging that he had less than the normal memory, attention,
imagination. Insane people, infants, are liable for torts of certain
kinds. Their mental defects do not discharge them. Jasper was
"bound" to remember, (must act as he would act, if he remembered,
must be treated by the courts as he would be treated if he had remembered), that he had a guest in his house, who could not be properly immured therein by him.
But a man may induce action so as to lose the right to complain of it.
Did the conduct of Hobbs unduly induce Jasper's oblivion of the fact
that he had so recently been in the house, and that he was probably still
there? The learned court below thinks that it did. it is possibly unusual for a guest, advised that the host must prepare quickly for a journey, and, left by the host, in order that he may thus prepare, to remain
alone in the house. If he gets tired of waiting he probably leaves the
house. He probably does not remain, after the lamp goes out. He
probably does not lie down and fall asleep. Had he been awake, Hobbs
would likely have heard the footsteps of Jasper to the door, the closing
and locking of the door. He would have had an opportunity to arrest
the departing Jasper. We think that the unusual conduct of Hobbs being a possible co-operating cause of Jasper's want of recollection of his
presence, it was competent for the tribunal, the judge himself, or the
jury, to determine whether it was in fact such a cause. If it was, if
Hobbs' conduct being usual and normal, the forgetfulness or the imprisonment would not have occurred, there was no wrong done to Hobbs.
The imprisonment was not a "false" imprisonment.
Normally, the causal influence of Hobbs' conductupon that of Jasper
should be determined by the jury. The parties however, seem to have
conceded that it was a matter for the decision of the court. We cannot
say therefore, that an error was committed, by the court, when it decided the question instead of referring it to a jury.
Affirmed.

COMMONWEALTH v. WILLIAM HOLPINS.
Seduction-Bellef that Seducee is oi Age, as Defense.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Holpins is indicted for the crime of seducing Mary Adams. He offered to prove that she had the appearance of a woman of 25 years of
age, had recently come into the neighborhood, and had, uniformally
stated her age to be 24 years. Defence was that he believed her to be 24
years old. The evidence was excluded and he was found guilty. Motion
for new trial.
Dickson for Plaintiff.
Edwards for Defendant.
OPINION OF COURT.
WARRINGTON, J.-Neither of the learned counsel seems to be
able to support his argument by a decision of the Pennsylvania or any
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other court. Although after a diligent search, we have been unable to
find any Pennsylvania decision, we have found numerons decisions of
different courts of U. S. and England in direct point with the case at bar.
The defendant is being tried for perpetrating an act which is not
only malum prohibitum but repugnant to the public morals of the state
and community in which he lives. In order to prevent the perpetration
of such crimes and immoralities, the laws of this commonwealth must be
strictly construed, and the violators of said laws punished.
The act of March 31, 1860, P. & L. 394, specifically says that "The seduction of any female of good repute, under twenty-one years of age,
with illicit connection, under promise of marriage, is hereby declared to
be a misdemeanor."
We are unable tp so construe this statute as to support the argument offered by the defence, that the seducer must know or have good
reason to believe that the girl is under twenty-one years of age. We
are of the opinion, that a person, committing such acts, as so directly
tend to corrupt the public morals, should do so at his own peril, and if
he breaks a law of the state he should be punished. We do not arrive at
opinion through prejudice nor without precedent.
In Donley v. State, 71 S. W. 598, it was held that in an indictment for
rape, hearsay evidence is admissible to prove age of girl, when based
upon information derived from deceased relatives, of the party in question, or from family histories; but unless it is shown to come from one
30 S. W. 479; 55
or the o~her of these sources, it should be rejected."
S. W. 61.
In the case at bar the information was received from prosecutrix,
who is alive and capable of testifying, therefore, evidence cannot be admitted on those grounds. In 81 Ark. 16 held that "Evidence that prosecutrix had stated that she was over sixteen years of age was inadmissible. "
In 8 Iowa 447, Wright, C. J., said, "In the case at bar, however, if defendant enticed a female away, for the purpose of defilement or prostitution, there existed a criminal or wrongful intent,
even though she was over fifteen; therefore the testimony offered
was irrelevant, for the only effect of it would have been to show, that he
intended one wrong and by mistake committed another. And though
the wrong intended was even not indictable, the defendant would still be
liable if the wrong done is so." Bishops Cr. Law secs. 247, 249, 252, 254,
(Note 4). In this last section the rule is briefly stated thus: "The
wrong intended but not done and the wrong done but, not intended,
coalesce, and together constitute the same offense, not always in the
same degree, as if the prisoner had intended the thing unintentionally
done."
Where a statute prohibits under certain circumstances or conditions
an act in itself immoral, it has been repeatedly held that the doer is
guilty, if the circumstances or conditions exist notwithstanding that he
committed the act in the belief that they did not exist. Knowledge of
age is immaterial. 143 Mass. 32; 31 Am. Rep. 236; 25 Neb. 38; 9 Mich.
150. 83 N. C. 608.
McFarlane, J., 109 Mo. 654: "His intent to violate the laws of
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morality and the good order of society, though with consent of the girl
and though in a case where he supposes he shall escape punishment satisfies the demands of the law." Therefore testimony that he believed
girl to be of certain age was rightly rejected. 165 Mass. 66, held no error for judge to instruct the jury that "unless defendant knew or had
reasonable cause to know that said Emma was under 16 years of age, he
cannot be convicted, althou ,h the jury should find that he did the acts,
claimed by said Emm, to have been done by him." 30 L. R. A. 734,
Knowlton, J.: "It is a familiar rule that if one commits a crime intentionally, he is responsible criminally for the consequences of his act, if
the offence proves to be different from that which he intended." Reg v.
Prime L: R. 2 C. C. 154, 175.
Defendant may show that the female is over the statutory age, but
he cannotgive her declaration to another, nor state how old he took her
to be. 33 Cyc. 1472, 3 Pennew (Del.) 19, 11 Mo. 271.
Defendant is indicted under statute making it a crime to have carnal
knowledge of a girl, unmarried, and under 21 years of age. Therefore
after a careful review of the decisions which have been handed down by
the different courts of the country, we are of the opinion, that it is no excuse that he (defendant) honestly believed the girl to be over twenty-one
years of age, since there existed a criminal or wrongful intent notwithstanding such belief. 69 Col. 315; 31 Pac. 107; 115 Mo. 480, 18 So. 117.
In case at bar defendant knew that he was breaking the law. His intended crime was fornication at least.
There was no error by court below in excluding evidence. Motion
for new trial refused.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The conclusion reached by the court below at the trial, and upon the
motion for a new trial is correct. The defendant knew that his act was
criminal. It was malum in se. He must be held to have taken the risk
that the female was below 21 years of age. The statute intends to punish sexual commerce with one who in fact is a female under 21, procured
by means of a promise of marriage. Cf. State v. Johnson, 115 Mo. 480;
Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 30 Gratt. 845; State v. Rub], 8 Ia. 449. An
able discussion of the subject may be found in Brown v. State, 74 AtI.
836 (Del.) where the same result is reached, as by the learned court
below.
Judgment affimed.

JONES v. SMITH.
Bill to Set Aside Deed, in Fraud of Husband.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
John Jones was engaged to Mary Smith. They were to be married
January 12, 1909. On January 11, 1909, Mary Smith made a voluntary
conveyance of all her realty to her brother, John Smith. On January
13, one day after the wedding and while his wife was still living, Jones
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discovered that his wife had conveyed her realty and immediately filed a
bill in equity to have the deed cancelled.
Jackson for Plaintiff.
Dipple for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
GILBERT, J.-The question raised here is purely a legal one. There is
no doubt that it is well settled that when a woman, in anticipation of an intended marriage, without the knowledge of her intended husband, executes
a transfer or conveyance of her property in such a way as to deprive him
of all benefit in it, and her control over it, such transactions will be declared to be a legal fraud upon him.
Duncan's Appeal, 43 Pa. 67, was an instance of that character.
There a married woman, two days before her marriage, executed a deed
of trust, without the knowledge of her intended husband, conveying her
property to her half-brothers in trust, to pay the income to her during
life. and to her heirs after death, and in case of her death without issue,
then to her half brothers. After marriage the husband filed a bill to
annul the deed. A decree to that effect was made in lower court, which
Supreme Court affirmed.
Chief Justice said: "Common candor forbids that so important a
change in his intended wife's circumstances, and her power over her estate should be made without his consent, and equity sternly condemns
it as a fraud upon his just expectations. This principle of equity has
stood the test of experience too long to be open for dispute now."
Thus in the light of previous decisions, and the general rules of law
in Pennsylvania we hereby grant the prayer of the bill.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The courts began long ago, to take a very sordid view of marriage,
because possibly, that was the view which prevailed among the people
at the time. The husband, they thought, sought the wife for the property with which she would endow him. If then, she alienated this property without his knowledge, shortly before the marriage, she was said
to commit a fraud upon him, such a fraud as required the conveyance,
when not to a bonafide purchaser for value, to be set aside. A deed to
a trustee, e. g., would thus be set aside; Duncan's Appeal, 43 Pa. 67;
Belt v. Ferguson, 3 Gr. 289. Indeed, even when the man did not know
that the woman whom he intended to marry, owned any thing, a conveyance by her, in the earlier part of the day on which the marriage occurred, was deemed fraudulent as to him, the grantee not being a purchaser for value; Robinson v. Buck, 71 Pa. 386.
Strange to say, it seems doubtful whether a wife could set aside a
conveyance made by her husband, just before the marriage, at least, if
the conveyance was of personal property. Potter v. Safe Deposit Co..
199 Pa. 366, although a conveyance was set aside in Baird v. Stearns, 15
Phila. 339.
Should the courts purposely and finally allow a man to disappoint the
woman, but not the woman the man, by a pre-nuptial conveyance, there
will be justification for the agitation of the suffragettes, and the more
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implacable and persistent it becomes, the better, It would be a shame
and disgrace to make the distinction which 199 Pa. 366, may be suspected
to foreshadow.
Affirmed.

BOOK REVIEWS.
Cases on the Law of Trusts, by THADDEUS DAVIS KENNESON, West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn, 1911.

The American Case Book Series, of which the book whose
title we have given, is a member, promises to be most useful to
students of law and lawyers. The quality of most of the books
may be divined from the ability and reputation of many of their
compilers, who are leaders among the law-teaching profession.
The book before us contains nearly 400 cases, classified under
the nature and requisites of trusts; the nature of the cestui que
trust's interest; transfer of the respective interests of trustee
and cestui que trust; extinguishment of a trust; the duties of a
trustee; constructive trusts and equitable liens; tracing property wrongfully appropriated into its substitute; constructive
trusts and the statute of limitations. As was to be expected a
large number of the cases given are English, but cases from
many of the American jurisdictions also appear. The cases selected are well calculated to give the careful reader a very good
understanding of the fundamental principles of the law of trusts.
The compiler, Prof. Kenneson, is professor of law in the University of New York.

OFFICIAL POSITIONS OF LAW--DICKINSONIANS
The late elections have put a considerable number of Dickinson Law men into office.
Frederick B. Moser, 1898, has been elected judge of the
courts of Northumberland County.
The following have been elected District Attorneys:
Charles C. Greer, of Cambria County.
Frank H. Strouss, of Northumberland County.
Jasper Alexander, of Cumberland County.
Clair N. Graybill, of Juniata County.

Thomas B. Wilson, of MeKean County.
Samuel A. Lewis, of Frederick County, Md.
Roscoe Wright, of Washington State (to a third term).
Archibald M. Hoagland, of Lycoming County.
Marion Patterson, of Blair County.
The following are now in the office of District Attorney or
have completed their terms:
John M. Rhey, Cumberland County.
J. Mede Lininger, Butler County.
Arthur McDuvall, McKean County.
Albert S. Heck, Potter County.
W. S. Clark, Warren County.
J. R. Henninger, Butler County.
James C. Houser, Mifflin County.
Jesse C. Long, Jefferson County.
D. Edward Long, Chambersburg.
Samuel M. Bushman, New Mexico.
Arthur Rupley, Cumberland County.
Thomas Vale, Cumberland County.
W. Alfred Valentine, Luzerne County.
The following are or have been members of one or the other branch of the State Legislature.
Lorrie R. Holcomb, Luzerne County.
Samuel W. Kirk, Fulton County.
Frank P. Barnhart, Cambria County.
Alvin Sherbine, Cambria County.
Claude L. Reno, Lehigh County.
Aloysius C. Mclntire, W. Virginia.
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